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Abstract
Background: Syndromic surveillance complements traditional public health surveillance by collecting and analysing
health indicators in near real time. The rationale of syndromic surveillance is that it may detect health threats faster
than traditional surveillance systems permitting more timely, and hence potentially more effective public health
action. The effectiveness of syndromic surveillance largely relies on the methods used to detect aberrations. Very few
studies have evaluated the performance of syndromic surveillance systems and consequently little is known about
the types of events that such systems can and cannot detect.
Methods: We introduce a framework for the evaluation of syndromic surveillance systems that can be used in any
setting based upon the use of simulated scenarios. For a range of scenarios this allows the time and probability of
detection to be determined and uncertainty is fully incorporated. In addition, we demonstrate how such a framework
can model the benefits of increases in the number of centres reporting syndromic data and also determine the
minimum size of outbreaks that can or cannot be detected. Here, we demonstrate its utility using simulations of
national influenza outbreaks and localised outbreaks of cryptosporidiosis.
Results: Influenza outbreaks are consistently detected with larger outbreaks being detected in a more timely
manner. Small cryptosporidiosis outbreaks (<1000 symptomatic individuals) are unlikely to be detected. We also
demonstrate the advantages of having multiple syndromic data streams (e.g. emergency attendance data, telephone
helpline data, general practice consultation data) as different streams are able to detect different outbreak types with
different efficacy (e.g. emergency attendance data are useful for the detection of pandemic influenza but not for
outbreaks of cryptosporidiosis). We also highlight that for any one disease, the utility of data streams may vary
geographically, and that the detection ability of syndromic surveillance varies seasonally (e.g. an influenza outbreak
starting in July is detected sooner than one starting later in the year). We argue that our framework constitutes a
useful tool for public health emergency preparedness in multiple settings.
Conclusions: The proposed framework allows the exhaustive evaluation of any syndromic surveillance system and
constitutes a useful tool for emergency preparedness and response.
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Background
Syndromic surveillance collects, analyses, interprets and
disseminates health-related data to provide early warnings
about public health threats in near-real-time [1]. The orig-
inal focus of syndromic surveillance was on both potential
covert release of a disease causing agent, as well as moni-
toring of the more established risks of emerging infectious
disease outbreaks. A key rationale of syndromic surveil-
lance is that it may detect health threats faster than tra-
ditional surveillance systems, such as laboratory reports,
which may permit more timely, and hence potentially
more effective public health action to reduce morbidity
and mortality [2]. Syndromic surveillance may help pro-
vide situational awareness, determining the trends, size,
spread, and tempo of outbreaks, or provide reassurance
that significantly large outbreaks are not occurring [3].
Syndromic surveillance systems are often used within
national surveillance programmes, to detect a wide variety
of events. In this study, we define detection as the iden-
tification of anomalous patterns (aberrations) in one or
more syndromic indicators (e.g. increases in shortness of
breath) within one or more syndromic data streams (e.g.
emergency department attendances or telehealth calls)
[4]. This is common to most papers on syndromic surveil-
lance detection. Following detection of such an anomalous
statistical pattern, in most cases this would be evaluated
further bringing in additional information such as labora-
tory test data and medical intelligence methods to eval-
uate whether the detection is of public health relevance.
The process through which this is achieved is described
elsewhere for England [5]. In this paper we focus purely
upon the detection of an anomalous statistical pattern in
the syndromic indicators.
The main challenge in developing the analytical and
statistical methods that underpin syndromic surveillance
systems is detecting signals of anomalous activity in the
presence of substantial background noise [3]. This is usu-
ally achieved using statistical methods, which use histor-
ical or recent data to determine statistical limits within
which usual activity is expected to fall. A data value out-
side these bounds (exceedance) is a marker of potential
unusual activity that might require further investigation.
However, many of these exceedances may be random
events of no public health consequence. Therefore, any
statistical exceedances are usually rigorously examined
before any public health action is taken [5]. For context,
in England only around 0.8% of all statistical exceedances
result in public health action.
To fully evaluate the public health role of syndromic
surveillance, it is critical to assess the types of events that
can be detected, how long such systems take to detect the
event, and (of equal importance) those events that cannot
be detected. For example, an outbreak of cryptosporidio-
sis may only be detected if a minimum number of cases
access health care services, and this may vary between
different geographical locations.
Research evaluating the performance of syndromic
surveillance systems is scarce and has typically used a
single disease type [6, 7], and one or two syndromic
data sources [8–11]. This knowledge gap is important
to address because different diseases and data streams
are likely to exhibit different behaviours (see for example
[12, 13]). In some studies, single day outbreak data were
used to evaluate the detection performance of aberration
detection methods [14, 15] which conflicts with the real
behaviour of epidemics [8]. Some studies have simulated
syndromic data [10, 16] which raises questions as to how
well such data represent real trends in syndromic time
series. One major limitation of previous studies is that
they rarely incorporate uncertainty into their analyses.
This arises from differences in the spread of outbreaks,
but also in uncertainty over the proportions of people con-
sulting health services and how these consultations will
be coded to a particular syndromic indicator by a health
professional [7, 8, 12]. Also, few studies have investigated
important information such as whether detection abilities
vary according to the size of the outbreak, its duration,
time of year or geographical location [7, 12].
Here, we present an evaluation framework used for
an exhaustive evaluation of the detection capabilities of
syndromic surveillance systems. For this paper, we use
England as a case study but the comprehensive evalua-
tion framework could just as easily be applied in different
international settings with varying outbreak detection sys-
tems. The results are presented for two contrasting public
health events: (1) a national pandemic of influenza and (2)
a localised outbreak of cryptosporidiosis associated with a
public water supply. While the specific results are of most
relevance to one country (England) we suggest that many
of the broad themes may have wider applicability.
Context and specific aims
In England, the Real-time Syndromic Surveillance Team
(ReSST) at Public Health England (PHE) obtains and
analyses data from four National Health Service (NHS)
healthcare settings. These systems are based upon NHS-
111 (a telehealth consultation system) calls [17], in-
hours General Practitioner (GPIHSS) and out-of-hours
and unscheduled care General Practitioner (GPOOHSS)
consultations [18, 19], and emergency department (ED)
attendances (EDSSS) [20]. In England, a General Practi-
tioner is a medical generalist doctor who acts as the first
point of contact between patients and the NHS.
Each of the four PHE syndromic surveillance sys-
tems uses daily data on syndromic health indicators (e.g.
influenza-like illness recorded in GPOOHSS). The health
indicators from these syndromic surveillance streams are
analysed on a daily basis using epidemiological methods
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and within a multi-level mixed-effects model (RAMMIE)
for the detection of aberrations [21]. Each health indica-
tor from these different surveillance system is routinely
aggregated and analysed at national, regional and local
levels.
The aims of this study were three-fold. First, we inves-
tigated how the characteristics of different disease out-
breaks (e.g. outbreak size, time of year and geography of
affected area) affected whether an outbreak was detected
and the time to detection. Second, we studied the utility
of different syndromic surveillance systems (e.g. NHS-
111 vs. GPIHSS) to detect different disease outbreaks.
Lastly, we investigated the potential effects of an increase
in syndromic surveillance coverage (e.g. proportion of
emergency departments reporting to ReSST) on time to
detection and probability of detection of an outbreak.
Methods
Overview of the evaluation framework
To fully assess the detection capabilities of syndromic
surveillance systems in England an evaluation framework
was developed. This framework builds upon the studies
conducted byMorbey et al. [13], Bolt et al. [7], and Jackson
et al. [12].
The proposed framework uses the outbreak detection
system implemented in England as a case study and has
five main stages (Fig. 1). First, we used compartmental
models to simulate epidemic curves (outbreaks) of varying
characteristics (e.g. outbreak size, length of the incuba-
tion and infectious periods). Second, we converted the
simulated outbreak data into syndromic indicator data
for different syndromic data streams (e.g. influenza-like
illness consultations to GPOOHSS) using a series of scal-
ing factors. Third, for each of these syndromic indicator
datasets, baseline data (i.e. expected numbers of reports
in the absence of an outbreak) were computed based
on historical time series analysis of observed syndromic
surveillance data. Fourth, the simulated syndromic indica-
tor data were added to the baseline time series to produce
evaluation datasets. Finally, the evaluation datasets were
input into the detection system, and the time to detection
Fig. 1 Framework overview. Stages of the proposed framework for
the evaluation of aberration detection methods
(TD) and the probability of detection (PD) were calculated
for each outbreak simulation.
One novel feature of our work is that uncertainty is
explicitly accounted for. Hence, for each simulated out-
break multiple simulations were produced to account for
uncertainty (e.g. in outbreak size and the proportion of
individuals consulting health care). All these stages are
fully described in the following sections.
Description of scenarios
Two scenarios were used here to exemplify the useful-
ness of the proposed framework. These were two health
threats for which syndromic surveillance systems would
be required for providing early warning. The first sce-
nario consisted of a pandemic caused by a novel strain
of influenza arriving into England. Influenza cases were
assumed to be randomly imported into the country
with a mean of five cases per day for a 90-day period.
Autochthonous transmission begins after the arrival of
the first imported cases. The new strain was assumed to
behave similarly to the 2009/2010 A(H1N1)pdm09 ‘swine
flu’ pandemic with a rapid spread throughout the pop-
ulation due to lack of immunity [22]. As a pandemic is
likely to spread across the whole country, national level
syndromic indicators were examined.
The second scenario was a point-source release of Cryp-
tosporidium spp. oocysts (the organism responsible for
cryptosporidiosis) into a public water supply system. Con-
tamination was assumed to occur at a continuous rate
over a three-day period after which public health action
(e.g. boil-water advisory) is taken to prevent further intake
of contaminated water. Public water supply outbreaks are
likely to be geographically restricted (see for example
[23]). Hence, the analysis of the syndromic data focused
upon sub-national geographies. To further explore the
potential influence of geography, the cryptosporidiosis
outbreaks were modelled to occur in three randomly cho-
sen locations: one large metropolitan area (location A),
and two smaller, predominantly rural areas (locations B
and C).
Step 1: outbreak simulation
Outbreaks of pandemic influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 and
cryptosporidiosis were simulated using disease-specific
compartmental models. A compartmental model is a
series of differential equations that estimate the number
of infective people per unit time (e.g. days) based on dif-
ferent parameters (e.g. transmission rate, incubation and
infectious periods) of the disease under scope [24]. A full
description of the compartmental models can be found in
the Additional file 1.
Three outbreak sizes were defined for each disease. For
pandemic influenza, outbreak size was defined as a func-
tion of the basic reproduction number (R0) which can
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be thought as the number of secondary infections gener-
ated per primary case. The size levels defined correspond
to the 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles of the range of R0
values (i.e. 1.57, 2.25 and 2.93) found on previous stud-
ies for pandemic influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 [25–28]. For
cryptosporidiosis, outbreak size was defined in terms of
the number of people consuming un-boiled contaminated
water over a three-day exposure period based on the
established literature [23, 29–32] and expert knowledge.
Thus, each day over the exposure period, a Poisson-
distributed random number of people with mean λ is
exposed to the contaminated water source. For compara-
tive purposes, the same λ values were used for locations
A, B and C. Detailed information about the specific values
used on each model can be found on the Additional file 1.
All possible combinations of the 10th, 50th, and 90th
percentiles of the range of values for the model parame-
ters indicated on Table 1 were used to simulate numerous
possible outbreak signals and to explore uncertainties in
our estimates. Data were simulated at daily time steps for
coherence with the syndromic data. All simulations were
performed in R [33] using the deSolve package [34].
Step 2: conversion to syndromic data
Cases from the outbreak simulations were converted into
the numbers of people estimated to consult healthcare
systems and hence be captured by one of the four PHE
syndromic surveillance data streams. This was achieved
by multiplying the compartmental model output by the
10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles of the range of values of
the proportion of the population estimated to consult
different forms of healthcare (Table 2) [35, 36]. Not all
healthcare providers report syndromic surveillance data
to the ReSST, and so simulated data were also multiplied
by the estimated coverage of each syndromic system
(Table 2). Finally, simulated data were scaled by the esti-
mated proportion of people coded to a syndromic indi-
cator (Table 2). The estimates for the proportion of the
population seeking medical advice for the selected con-
ditions are not well known. Therefore, here they were
estimated based on previous studies [35, 36] and expert
knowledge.
In this study we assumed that the probability (p) of
symptomatic people (i) seekingmedical attention will vary
depending on how many days have passed since the onset
of symptoms. Following Fan et al. [6] we assumed the
following probability distribution of symptomatic people
seeking medical attention: 55.9% on day 1, 35.7% on day
2, 7.2% on day 3, 0.8% on day 4, 0.2% on day 5 and 0.2%
on day 6. The same probabilities were used for influenza
and cryptosporidiosis. The matrix below illustrates how
the number of new outbreak cases i at day t (denoted by it)
were calculated to seek medical attention based on the
probabilities pt . As the matrix shows, at day t = 1, p1i1
people will seek medical attention the same day, p2i1 peo-
ple will seek medical attention the day after, and so on
until day six after the onset of symptoms. At day t = 2,
p1i2 people will seek medical attention the same day, p2i2
will do so the day after, and so on.
PtIt =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
p1i1 0 0 0 . . . 0
p1i2 p2i1 0 0 . . . 0
p1i3 p2i2 p3i1 0 . . . 0
...
...
...
... . . .
...
p1it p2it−1 p3it−2 p4it−3 . . . ptit−5
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
Table 1 Model parameters. Parameters used for the compartmental models of influenza and cryptosporidiosis
Parameter Range Reference Uncertainty explored
Influenza
Reproductive Number (R0) 1.4–3.1 [25–28] Yes
Incubation period (σ ) 1.0–7.0 days [26, 46–50] Yes
Infectious period (γ ) 2.6–12.0 days [28, 46, 50] Yes
Fraction of symptomatic people (p) 0.5–0.75 [46, 50] Yes
Infectivity reduction in asymptomatic people (k) 0.1–1.0 [28] Yes
Cryptosporidiosis
Number of people exposed to contaminated water per day (λ) 747–10354 [23, 29–32] Yes
Average daily un-boiled water consumption in litres (w) 1.8 L [29] No
Number of oocysts released into the water system per litre (o) 10-1,000,000 [30–32] Yes
Dose-response hyper-parameters (α, β) 0.115, 0.176 [31, 51] No
Incubation period (σ ) 1.0–21.0 days [29, 30, 52, 53] Yes
Infectious period (γ ) 3.0–50.0 days [30, 54] Yes
Fraction of infectious and symptomatic people (p) 0.2–0.9 [52, 54] Yes
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Table 2 System features. Percentage of people consulting different healthcare providers, percentage of people coded to an indicator,
and proportional coverage of each PHE syndromic surveillance system. Upper and lower estimates are presented in brackets
System People consulting healthcare (%) Estimated current coverage (%) People coded to an indicator (%)
Influenza Cryptosporidiosis Influenza Cryptosporidiosis Influenza Cryptosporidiosis
National All sites National Location A Location B Location C National All sites
EDSSS 0.91% (0.5–5.0%) 0.01% (0.0025–0.023%) 7% 15% 23% 47% 6% 75%
GPIHSS 10% (5.0–30.0%) 2.3% (1.0–5.6%) 64% 64% 95% 86% 6% 75%
GPOOHSS 1% (0.5–3.0%) 2.3% (1.0–5.6%) 65% 65% 7% 33% 29% 75%
NHS-111 1.28% (0.25–10.0%) 0.8% (0.1–0.9%) 100% 100% 100% 100% 22% 75%
Step 3: computation of baseline data
The most sensitive codes used by clinicians for cap-
turing people with signs and symptoms of pandemic
influenza are cold/flu when accessing NHS-111 [17],
and influenza-like-illness via GPIHSS, GPOOHSS
[18, 19], or EDSSS [20]. Hence system-specific and
indicator-specific baseline data were obtained from the
Rising Activity, Multi-level Mixed-effects, Indicator
Emphasis (RAMMIE) model [21], which is currently used
for routine surveillance in England.
Here, we use RAMMIE as a study case. In other set-
tings different detection methods such as CUSUM or
Farrington Flexible could be substituted [37, 38]. This
model uses as its input historical long-term records of
syndromic data. Briefly, RAMMIE is a multi-level mixed-
effects regression model that benefits from the hierar-
chical structure of the syndromic surveillance signals
which are subsets of national signals [21]. A negative
binominal functional form is used to account for possi-
ble over-dispersion in the syndromic surveillance data.
To allow for changes in data volume, the model uses an
offset (registered patient population of GP practices or
total daily activity depending on the data stream). The
model accounts for the effects of independent variables
including day of the week, bank holidays, and month of
the year. Further details of the RAMMIE model can be
found elsewhere [21]. Here, we use RAMMIE to esti-
mate the mean number of system-specific and indicator-
specific syndromic counts (henceforth baseline data), and
their corresponding detection thresholds. This method-
ology is different to other well known methods such as
cumulative sums (CUSUM) [37], exponentially weighted
moving averages (EWMA) [39], or sequential probability
ratio tests (SPRT) [40] which are also used in syndromic
surveillance.
Baseline data for influenza were aggregated at the
national level. We assume that people with signs and
symptoms of cryptosporidiosis are most likely to be coded
as diarrhoea in all four syndromic surveillance systems,
and these data were modelled using the RAMMIE model
for the same period as the influenza data. However, for
cryptosporidiosis baselines were estimated for each of the
3 locations independently.
Syndromic baseline data would typically vary between
years. To explore these effects on outbreak detection,
we simulated 100 Monte-Carlo samples for each base-
line time series using random sampling. Gaussian and
Poisson distributions were used to simulate the Monte-
Carlo samples. The decision as to whether a Gaussian or
a Poisson distribution would be used for a given baseline
was based on the distribution of the original data. Thus, if
the original time series was Poisson distributed, a Poisson
distribution was also assumed for each of the simulated
time series. The number ofMonte-Carlo samples was gov-
erned by the large computation time required to test our
scenarios.
Step 4: superimpose outbreak data to baseline
Evaluation datasets were created by adding the syndromic
data to each of the 100 Monte-Carlo simulated baseline
time series. The process was repeated varying the start
date of outbreaks (on every other day) across the whole
year to explore potential effects of month of the year on
outbreak detection.
Step 5: detection algorithm
Given the large number of simulations to be assessed, we
would expect some statistical alarms by chance. Hence to
reduce the impact of false alarms on TD and PD, detection
is defined as the earliest day after which the evalua-
tion data alarms for three or more consecutive days. We
take the pragmatic approach of prioritising exceedances
that have repeated for three or more consecutive days
in a row because the chance of repeated consecutive
false alarms is significantly less likely than single day
false alarms. In addition, all the synthetic outbreaks con-
sidered here are considerably longer than three days in
duration.
Here, TD was considered as the time elapsed between
the onset of the outbreak and the first day of its detec-
tion (i.e the first of three days) [12]. The median TD for
an outbreak was computed as the median across the 100
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Monte-Carlo-derived evaluation time series for a given
baseline. Studentized bootstrap sampling was used to esti-
mate the 95% confidence intervals for the median TD
based on 1000 samples. The ReSST examine all statisti-
cal alarms on weekdays using a risk assessment tool [5]
and thus, in the event of an alarm which looks particularly
unusual from a public health perspective, public health
authorities could be highlighted about detection two days
earlier than estimated using this framework. The PD was
calculated as the proportion of detected outbreaks across
all 100 Monte-Carlo-derived evaluation series [12]. Out-
breaks with a PD lower than or equal 50% were considered
as not detected. Median TD was preferred over mean TD
because the median is more robust to the presence of
outliers.
Estimating what size of an outbreak is required to achieve
a 50% probability of detection
Although we simulated a considerable number of out-
breaks of different sizes, from a public health point of view
it is important to understand the size of outbreaks that
can and cannot be detected. Here, we defined detection
as a PD of 50% or greater. Thus, to achieve this, we incre-
mentally increased the size of the outbreaks by increasing
the number of people affected by water contaminated
with Cryptosporidium spp. oocysts until the outbreak was
detected. For this exercise, we kept the length of the incu-
bation and infectious periods, the probability of infection,
and the proportion of asymptomatic people constant to
their 50th percentile values. For influenza, outbreak size
was increased incrementally by increasing the R0 until an
outbreak was detected. As in the case of cryptosporidiosis,
the value of all other parameters remained unchanged.
Comparing time to detection and probability of detection
under a 100% coverage assumption
In an ideal situation, there would be 100% coverage by
all syndromic surveillance systems to obtain data for the
entire population. This is currently not the case for all sys-
tems. We investigated how a hypothetical 100% coverage
in each syndromic surveillance system would affect TD
and PD, by scaling up the overall mean on each syndromic
time series whilst assuming that the variance in the sam-
ple was representative of the entire population. Syndromic
data were scaled up as follows:
Yi = xi − μi + νi
ν = μ / coverage
where Yi is the time series of scaled syndromic data esti-
mated for syndromic surveillance system i, under the
assumption of a 100% coverage, x is the observed time
series of syndromic data, μ is the mean of x, and ν is
the estimated mean of x assuming a 100% coverage. The
scaled time series were then used as a baseline for the
evaluation framework. Simulated outbreak data were then
imposed onto the scaled up syndromic baseline data after
being converted into numbers of people expected to con-
sult healthcare, and to be coded to each of the indicators
considered in the study.
Results
The EDSSS and GPOOHSS systems had a lower mean
number of consultations than the other two systems
for the influenza and cryptosporidiosis indicators (see
Additional file 1). A total of 4,422,600 time series (i.e.
243 outbreaks ×100 Monte-Carlo-derived baseline time
series × 182 initial dates) were simulated for each syn-
dromic indicator for a total of 70,761,600 evaluation time
series (4,422,600 time series ×4 locations ×4 indicators
per location). Comparisons between historical outbreaks
and the simulated epidemic curves for each disease are
presented in the Additional file 1 and both show good
agreement.
For each scenario, PD, TD, and the numbers of symp-
tomatic people at the detection point are presented in
Table 3. In this table, results are presented stratified by
indicator and outbreak size, and we recall that three out-
break sizes were defined for each disease and, in the case
of cryptosporidiosis, for three different locations.We note
that given that detection is defined as three consecutive
alarm days the probability of observing a false positive
under our scenarios is extremely low.
All outbreaks of pandemic influenza were detected by
every syndromic surveillance system (PD = 1.00). The
median false positive rate accross systems was zero. There
were statistically significant between-system differences
(ANOVA, p <0.001) in median TD for influenza. We
noted that TD was negatively related to the size of the
outbreak. Thus, for example, the GPIHSS-influenza-like-
illness indicator, the influenza-related indicator with the
lowest TD (Table 3), detected outbreaks of size 1 at day
102 (95% C.I. 56–162 days), outbreaks of size 2 at day
61 (95% C.I. 33–96 days), and outbreaks of size 3 at
day 47 (95% C.I. 25–73 days). At these times in the out-
break we would expect about 9447, 12612, and 14201
cases of symptomatic pandemic influenza in England
respectively. After GPIHSS, detection is followed by
NHS-111-cold/flu, GPOOHSS-influenza-like-illness and
EDSSS-influenza-like-illness.
Conversely, Table 3 indicates that the PD for out-
breaks of cryptosporidiosis was highly variable ranging
between 0–100%. This situation highlights the advan-
tages of incorporating uncertainty into the analysis.
The false positive rate was zero for all three loca-
tions. Using a detection threshold of 50%, almost
none of the outbreaks of size 1 were detected by
any of the system-indicator combinations in any of
the three areas. The exception was GPIHSS-diarrhoea
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that was able to detect approximately 60% of the out-
breaks of size 1 but only in Locations B and C.
The PD became closer to one as the size of the simu-
lated outbreaks increased. The size 2 outbreaks were only
detected in the locations B and C and not by all systems
whereas outbreaks of size 3 where detected in all three
locations and by all syndromic surveillance systems except
for EDSSS. In terms of efficacy, the GPIHSS-diarrhoea
and GPOOHSS-diarrhoea were the most sensitive for the
detection of outbreaks of cryptosporidiosis with GPIHSS
being slightly more sensitive. However, the most effi-
cient indicator varied between areas. For example, in
Location A GPOOHSS had the highest PD for a size 2
outbreak whereas in Location B GPIHSS had the high-
est PD. NHS-111-diarrhoea detected very few outbreaks
but EDSSS-diarrhoea detected none. There were statis-
tically significant differences in PD between syndromic
indicators for the two diseases (ANOVA, p <0.001).
Due to the point source nature of the outbreaks of cryp-
tosporidiosis where many individuals are exposed to the
pathogen over a brief period of time, TD was considerably
lower than that for influenza (Table 3). Statistically signif-
icant differences (ANOVA, p < 0.001) were observed in
median TD across indicators for cryptosporidiosis in the
three areas. Based on the results of the most sensitive syn-
dromic surveillance system (GPIHSS and GPOOHSS), the
median TD for oubreaks of cryptosporidiosis of size 3 was
three days except for location A where it was 4 days.
This variability in PD and TD lead to variations in the
size of outbreak that can be detected (i.e. the numbers
of symptomatic people at the point of detection). For
example, if we focus upon a size 3 outbreak of cryp-
tosporidiosis then Table 3 indicates that at the point of
detection there would be between 1400 symptomatic indi-
viduals in Location B, 1700 in Location C, and 4400 in
location A. GPIHSS-diarrhoea and GPOOHSS-diarrhoea
appeared similar in their detection ability with the best
system varying between the three areas.
Figure 2 compares the median TD for each system
stratified by month, and indicates that for influenza, TD
depends upon when the first case occurs. An outbreak
with a first influenza case with onset between February
and July tended to have, on average, a lower TD in com-
parison to an initial case with onset between August and
January. For example, an outbreak of influenza of size 3
starting in July is detected, on average, seven days earlier
than one starting in November (e.g. 40 vs. 47 days based
on GPIHSS influenza-like-illness). Conversely, for cryp-
tosporidiosis Fig. 2 indicates few clear patterns suggesting
little seasonal variation on TD.
We then used our framework to investigate the mini-
mum size an influenza or cryptosporidiosis outbreak that
would be detected at least 50% of the time. The results
indicate that the number of symptomatic people at the
median TD required to achieve a PD of approximately
0.5 varies considerably between systems (Table 4). For
influenza, the smallest detectable outbreak was estimated
to have an R0 of 1.09 secondary cases per primary case.
Such an outbreak would be detected by the GPIHSS sys-
tem in about 358 days as the number of symptomatic
people reaches three thousand. We noted that compared
to the other three systems, the number of symptomatic
people required to obtain a PD of about 0.5 was an order of
magnitude lower for the GPIHSS system (three thousand
compared against 48–82 thousand). This results concur
with the results in Table 3.
For cryptosporidiosis, the estimated minimum num-
ber of exposed people required for achieving about 0.50
PD ranged between 2200 and 4200 people depending on
the location under scope. This equates to 700 to 1300
people experiencing symptoms. Thus, in location A, the
minimum number of exposed people required for about
0.50 PD was 4200. Such an outbreak would be detected
in approximately 18 days as the number of symptomatic
people reaches 1300. In locations B and C, however, the
minimum size of the outbreak required for about 0.50 PD,
was considerably lower (i.e. 2200 and 2300 exposed peo-
ple, respectively) although TD was similar (18–19 days).
As expected, given the low PD observed in the EDSSS-
diarrhoea indicator, the estimated exposed population
required to achieve a about 0.50 PD was considerably
greater for the EDSSS system than for the others.
We then investigated the effects of an increase in system
coverage to a 100% on each syndromic surveillance system
(Table 3). We noted a consistent decrease in TD in most
indicators compared to their current system coverage,
and the greatest changes occurred unsurprisingly in the
system-indicator combinations where coverage was low-
est. For influenza, the biggest change in TD was observed
in the EDSSS-influenza-like-illness indicator where we
estimate an average reduction of approximately 36% in TD
compared to its current coverage. From a public health
perspective EDSSS-influenza-like-illness then has a PD
and TD comparable to the best system-indicator combi-
nations and is now clearly more sensitive than NHS-111-
cold/flu. Should all the indicators achieve a 100% coverage
then the best TD falls to 93, 56, and 42 days for a size 1, 2
and 3 outbreak respectively.
For cryptosporidiosis, the biggest relative decrease in
TD (50%) was observed in location B for the GPOOHSS-
diarrhoea indicator which changed from four to two days
for outbreaks of size 3; an unsurprising result as the
existing coverage is 7%. It is noted that similar absolute
changes in TD (2 days) were observed in other locations
and indicators such as GPIHSS-diarrhoea in location A
for outbreaks of size 3 (8 to 6 days), and GPOOHSS-
diarrhoea for outbreaks of size 2 (6 to 4 days). The
increase in coverage also had an effect on PD. Thus, for
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Fig. 2Median time to detection per month. Median TD for influenza and Cryptosporidium spp. outbreaks stratified by month of the onset and
syndromic indicator. The colour of the boxes indicate the median TD . The darkness of the box filling indicates the probability of detection (PD) as
defined in the legend. Boxes with a PD ≤0.50 were excluded
example, in location B, PD for the GPOOHSS-diarrhoea
indicator increased from 5 to 93% for outbreaks of size
1, from 12 to 97% for outbreaks of size 2, and from
83 to 100% for outbreaks of size 3. Should all the indi-
cators achieve a 100% coverage then the best TD falls
to 5, 3 and 2 days for a size 1, 2 and 3 outbreak
respectively.
Our framework allows the investigation of the effects
of different proportions of consulting to health services
on TD. A negative association was observed between the
proportion of people consulting a particular system and
TD. Thus, as the proportion of people consulting health-
care services increased, TD decreased. This situation is
shown in Fig. 3 for the four pandemic influenza indicators.
As can be observed, the trend was similar across all syn-
dromic surveillance systems. The difference between the
three levels of people consulting a healthcare system was
not significant (p >0.05) using an ANOVA test.
Discussion
Syndromic surveillance is increasingly used for the timely
detection of public health threats supporting existing pub-
lic health surveillance programmes. The aim is that faster
detection will lead to more effective public health action.
However, we argue in the introduction that there is a lack
of research critically assessing the types of events that
can be detected, how long such systems take to detect
the event, or characterising those events that cannot be
detected.
Here, we present a comprehensive framework for the
evaluation of syndromic surveillance systems. Building
upon previous work (see for example [7, 12, 13]) it incor-
porates a large number of different system-syndrome
indicators and fully incorporates uncertainty into the
assessments. We also explore a wide range of measures
relevant to public health such as the probability of and
time to detection for outbreaks of a pre-determined
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Table 4 Outbreak size required for PD of 0.5
Influenza
System Coverage Secondary cases TD (days) Symptomatic (thousand)
EDSSS 15% 1.26 318 81.9
GPIHSS 64% 1.09 358 3.0
GPOOHSS 65% 1.22 332 47.7
NHS-111 100% 1.22 348 63.1
Cryptosporidiosis
System Coverage People exposed (thousand) TD (days) Symptomatic (thousand)
(Location A)
EDSSS 15% 1,750.0 13 492.7
GPIHSS 64% 11.3 22 3.3
GPOOHSS 65% 4.2 18 1.3
NHS-111 100% 12.5 18 3.8
(Location B)
EDSSS 23% 512.4 13 144.4
GPIHSS 95% 2.2 19 0.7
GPOOHSS 7% 7.8 17 2.3
NHS-111 100% 3.5 16 1.0
(Location C)
EDSSS 47% 284.6 17 84.9
GPIHSS 86% 2.8 21 0.9
GPOOHSS 33% 2.4 18 0.7
NHS-111 100% 4.1 18 1.3
Estimated size of influenza and Cryptosporidium spp. outbreaks required to achieve at least a 0.5 probability of detection per syndromic surveillance system and region
size, the minimum size of outbreaks that would be
detected, and the numbers of symptomatic individu-
als at this point. We also explore the utility of vari-
ous system-syndrome indicators for different diseases,
as well as the impact of outbreak location and time of
year upon detection. Finally, we model the impact of
increasing the proportion of centres reporting data upon
our detection metrics. In our view, these methods pro-
vide guidance on how syndromic surveillance should be
assessed, and demonstrate the benefits of such a thorough
assessment.
For England, our results indicate that a national
pandemic of influenza similar to the 2009/2010
A(H1N1)pdm09 ‘swine flu’ pandemic with an R0 of 1.57,
2.25 and 2.93 is likely to be detected at day 102, 61, and
47 respectively at a point in time when there are likely
to be 9400, 12600 and 14200 symptomatic individuals.
The GPIHSS-influenza-like-illness was the most sensitive
indicator. We also estimate that should system cover-
age increase to 100% the TD for these three influenza
pandemics would fall to 91, 56 or 43 days, respectively. At
100% coverage the EDSSS-influenza like illness indicator
performs comparably to GPIHSS-influenza like illness.
Outbreaks of cryptosporidiosis will be more local in
nature and the ability to detect outbreaks of different sizes
varies by indicator. Small and medium size outbreaks (i.e.
about 854 and about 1281 exposed people per day) are not
consistently detected in all locations. The largest outbreak
(i.e. approximately 8539 exposed people per day), how-
ever, is consistently detected but the most sensitive system
varies betweenGPOOHSS andGPIHSS. Detection occurs
between 3 and 4 days at a point where there are between
1400 and 2400 symptomatic individuals. The minimum
size of outbreak that can be detected varies between 700
and 1300 symptomatic individuals at TD. However, if it
takes between 18 and 21 days to detect these smaller
outbreaks, the public health utility of these detections is
questionable.
We highlight that an increase in coverage of syndromic
data streams could improve the systems’ ability to detect
outbreaks of cryptosporidiosis at times and locations they
would currently go unnoticed. Previous studies using
syndromic surveillance data from a range of European
likely to be detected at day suggest that the detection of
outbreaks of gastrointestinal illness could be challenging,
particularly when using emergency department data
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Fig. 3Median TD per level of access to healthcare. Median TD for influenza outbreaks across four syndromic indicators for three different levels of
access to healthcare (see Table 2). The dots indicate the median TD , and the error bars depict the 95% studentized bootstrap prediction intervals.
Prediction intervals were estimated using 1000 bootstrap samples. Estimates with a probability of detection ≤75% were excluded
[41, 42]. Our results support this notion and indicate
that even under the assumption of a 100% coverage,
the EDSSS-diarrhoea indicator is unable to detect out-
breaks that would be detected using the other three
systems.
Although these results are specific to the syndromic
surveillance system in England, many of our findings are
likely to have wider applicability. Firstly, the framework
presented in this paper is inherently flexible and enables
one to simulate outbreaks of different sizes by allowing the
user to modify the parameters that determine their occur-
rence (e.g. the incubation and infectious periods, and the
number of secondary infections per primary case). Our
results indicate that PD increases and TD decreases as
the size of the outbreaks increases, a situation previously
observed [12]. Larger outbreaks cause a greater relative
increase in case counts when imposed onto the same
baseline data than small outbreaks. Also, larger outbreaks
tend to peak faster than smaller outbreaks. Previous
research on how the size of an outbreak influences PD and
TD has been constrained to a pre-defined set of values on
outbreak duration and size [12, 14, 15]. In our framework
the size and duration of an outbreak is determined by
the model parameters and so, they could potentially take
on any value. We also worked our model “backwards”
to identify the minimum size of outbreaks which can
be detected.
Most previous research has evaluated the perfor-
mance of syndromic surveillance using one or two
data streams [7, 8, 10–12]. Only a few studies have
used multi-stream data for evaluation [6, 13]. Here,
we used data from four different syndromic surveil-
lance systems and three different syndromes to explore
the uncertainties affecting detection. We highlight
the value of using different system-syndrome indicators
for event detection. For example, syndromic surveillance
data from emergency departments in England are use-
ful for the detection of pandemic influenza but not for
the identification of local outbreaks of cryptosporidiosis.
This is likely due to the the very low proportion of peo-
ple expected to attend emergency departments for milder
illnesses such as cryptosporidiosis, and the lower propor-
tion of emergency department reporting data [41] (see
Table 2). Thus, when outbreak data are scaled down for
the EDSSS system, the result is a considerably lower num-
ber of symptomatic people being added to the baseline
posing difficulties for outbreak detection [12]. Interest-
ingly, emergency department data are the most widely
used source of syndromic surveillance data worldwide
[41, 43–45]. A further reason why different indicators may
be useful for aberration detection may be the specificity
of the coding systems used by different syndromic surveil-
lance systems. Thus our results reinforce previous studies
(e.g. [6]) highlighting the value of using multiple data
streams for improving outbreak detection across diseases.
Our results highlight further reasons why multiple data
streams may be useful, as indicator performance may vary
geographically. We demonstrate, for the first time, that
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PD may vary between geographical areas even when using
identical indicators for aberration detection. For example,
the ability of NHS-111-diarrhoea, to detect outbreaks of
cryptosporidiosis varied between 4 and 7 days between
the three locations. These differences emanate from the
fact that most detection methods are based upon the
prediction interval around a mean value. This interval is
based upon historical data and is likely to vary between
areas due to factors such as the size of the area, the health
seeking behaviour of the population as well as the under-
lying level of ill health that causes people to seek medical
attention. Hence PD and TD vary geographically.
To our knowledge, we also demonstrate for the first
time that detection ability varies seasonally. For exam-
ple, an influenza outbreak starting in England in the first
half of the year is likely to be detected in a more timely
manner than one starting in the second half of the year.
This is because the numbers of people reporting different
syndromes will vary over the year affecting the predic-
tion intervals and hence the additional level of activity to
trigger a statistical alarm.
One advantage of our approach is the incorporation of
uncertainty in the computation of aberration detection
metrics. Incorporating uncertainty provides a probabilis-
tic assessment of detection whichmatches the uncertainty
in the underlying assumptions. This additionally helps us
to understand where the largest uncertainties reside. In
England, the proportion of people with an illness who will
consult each of the available healthcare services is possi-
bly the largest source of uncertainty. A further source of
uncertainty is how these individuals, who have accessed
healthcare will be coded to a specific syndrome by health-
care professionals. There are statistically significant dif-
ferences in TD for different estimates of people accessing
healthcare systems in England. Further research needs
to address both these research gaps, and could also pro-
vide valuable information for emergency preparedness
and response [13]. Our framework offers a useful tool for
incorporating these sources of uncertainty in a systematic
manner.
One alternative to the use of compartmental models
within our framework would be to examine whether
actual outbreaks were detected using syndromic surveil-
lance. Potentially, such information could be used to esti-
mate the size of outbreaks that could be detected and
the TD. While an important complementary approach, the
use of actual outbreaks has its own limitations. All out-
breaks have different characteristics, hence comparability
between outbreaks is an important issue. Furthermore, a
modelling approach enables variables to be changed and
their impact examined. We explored how changes to sys-
tem coverage might influence detection and this could be
extended to examine changes to the coding system used
within healthcare or the proportion of people seeking
healthcare. These are only possible using a modelling
framework.
Finally, we re-iterate that although the statistical detec-
tion of aberrations in healthcare reporting is important,
it is only the first step within the syndromic surveillance
process. Following such a detection a complex risk assess-
ment process will usually be used [5] to identify whether
public health action is necessary.
Conclusions
There is little research critically assessing the types of
events that syndromic surveillance systems can detect.
Here we overcome these limitations through the imple-
mentation of a framework for the evaluation of such
systems. This framework allows the TD and PD for a range
of outbreaks to be calculated while fully incorporating
uncertainty into the assessment. We demonstrate how
such a framework can also model the benefits of increases
in the number of centres reporting syndromic data and
determine the minimum size of outbreaks that can or
cannot be detected. In this paper, the syndromic surveil-
lance systems in England are used as a case study, but our
method could easily be applied to varying international
settings with varying detection systems. Although the spe-
cific results are most pertinent to England, they highlight
that small gastrointestinal outbreaks (e.g. cryptosporid-
iosis) are unlikely to be detected unless the number of
symptomatic individuals is over 1000. We also demon-
strate the advantages of having multiple syndromic data
streams; we show emergency departments data are use-
ful for the detection of pandemic influenza but not for
the identification of local outbreaks of cryptosporidio-
sis. We also highlight that for any one disease, the utility
of data streams may vary between different geograph-
ical areas, and that the detection ability of syndromic
surveillance varies seasonally. For example, an influenza
outbreak starting in England in the first half of the year
should be detected sooner than one starting in the second
half of the year. We argue that our framework constitutes
a useful tool for public health emergency preparedness in
multiple settings.
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